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Abstract
In this work we present a logical reconstruction of Leonard Bloom-
field’s theory of structural linguistics. First, the central notions of this
theory are analyzed and discussed. In the following section, a recon-
struction with the so-called structuralist approach in the philosophy of
science is presented. After defining the general framework of Bloom-
field’s theory, questions of lawlikeness and theoretical terms will be
discussed. In a further step, this work aims to contribute to the dis-
cussion of theory change and scientific realism, applied to linguistic
theory. After the reconstruction of further theories of linguistics, it
can be studied whether certain inter theoretical relations hold. It aims
to be a contribution to the discussion on the foundations of linguistics.
structural linguistics - structuralist approach - lawlikeness -
theoretical terms - theory change
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1 Introduction
The aim of this work is to provide a logical reconstruction of Leonard Bloom-
field’s linguistic theory. Only few work has been done so far in the philosophy
of linguistics, concerning logical reconstructions of linguistic theories. By
the application of the methodological framework of the so-called structural-
ist approach (see Balzer, et.al. 1987), we reconstruct Bloomfield’s theory.
The reconstruction will provide new insights as it shows how the notions of
Bloomfield’s theory are interrelated. Furthermore, the issues of lawlikeness
and theoretical terms in Bloomfield’s theory will be addressed. A logical
reconstruction of Bloomfield’s theory also opens a way for future work on
intertheoretical relations between linguistic theories and, in a broader philo-
sophical sense, can be seen as an important fundamental contribution that
can be used in the discussion on theory change and scientific realism, applied
to linguistics.
Leonard Bloomfield is widely recognized as one of the most important
linguists in the in the first half of the twentieth century. Especially in the
phase before Noam Chomsky revolutionized linguistics. Bloomfield’s the-
ory of structural linguistics provided the basic fundament for later theories.
His theory was extremely influential in the community of linguists in that
time. After the publication of his first book An introduction to the study of
language in 1914, Bloomfield dedicated his work to the study of the Algo-
nquian languages, especially to Menomini, as his influential work Menomini
Morphophonemics shows. Bloomfield’s main work is his 1933 Language. He
presents his whole theory in this work. This work is a refined version of
his 1914, though it had been changed substantially in many chapters and
parts of his theory. This is especially the case for his theory of meaning,
which changed from a mentalist position in 1914, to a radical behaviorist
one in 1933. Due to the whole of Bloomfield’s work and the great influence it
had, the so-called school of American Structuralist Linguistics arose. Until
the upcoming of Chomsky’s highly influential early wok in the late fifties,
structural linguistics was seen as the standard approach in linguistics.
Earlier and during the same time, many structuralist schools in different
places were developed. All of them had in common that they related back to
Ferdinand de Saussure’s structuralist linguistics. The so-called Copenhagen-
school, with its main representative figure Louis Hjelmslev and the Prague-
school with its main figures Roman Jakobson and Nikolai Trubetzkoy are
generally counted as the central figures. What all these structuralist ap-
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proaches have in common is their focus on language as a structured (ordered
and recurrent) phenomenon, and that the best way to study language is to
understand it as consisting of certain smaller structural parts, into which
it should be decomposed. The name structuralism may have little in com-
mon with other structuralisms in other fields like in philosophy, mathematics,
anthropology or literary theory. The main motivation for calling these lin-
guistic schools structuralism comes probably out of the history of phonology.
There, one of the core figures was Jan Baudoin de Courtenay, who under-
stood language as a composition of small, structured units, which actually
realize sounds. It was Baudoin de Courtenay who introduced the notion of
phoneme into linguistics. Later, it was the group of european structuralists
like Trubetzkoy and Hjelmslev that systematized it 1.
Besides many other works, Bloomfield’s 1926 A Set of Postulates for
the Science of Language is his own intent of axiomatizing linguistics. He
outlines a list of definitions and assumptions, which aim to state clearly
what linguistics is about. In this sense, this work of Bloomfield counts as
a work on the foundations of his own scientific discipline and can also be
seen as a contribution to the philosophy of linguistics. It is of a special
importance for a logical reconstruction of Bloomfield’s theory. Bloomfield
states the importance of what he calls the postulational method :
The method of postulates (that is, assumptions or axioms) and
definitions is fully adequate to mathematics; as for other sciences,
the more complex their subject-matter, the less amenable are they
to this method, since, under it, every descriptive or historical
fact becomes the subject of a new postulate. Nevertheless, the
postulational method can further the study of language, because
it forces us to state explicitly whatever we assume, to define our
terms, and to decide what things may exist independently and
what things are interdependent (ibid: 153).
In this work, Bloomfield lists the fundamental postulates and definitions
of his theory. He aims to contribute to a clarification to the object of study
of the in 1926 yet immature science of linguistics. Bloomfield’s motivation of
making linguistics a more precise science can be seen as continuous with what
has been called the Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung or Scientific World-
View by members of the Vienna Circle as Otto Neurath and Rudolf Carnap.
1For a detailed study of the history of structural linguistics, see Seuren (1998).
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Bloomfield shared many meta-theoretical assumptions with Neurath and,
common in the years before World War II, also to Bloomfield a scientistic
world-view had become attractive. This can also be seen in the fact that
Neurath invited Bloomfield to contribute in his “International Enciclopedia
of Unified Science”, where Bloomfield published his Linguistic Aspects of
Science in 19502 . Already in his 1926, Bloomfield points out quite clearly
what he expects of a mature science of language:
Also, the postulational method saves discussion, because it limits
our statements to a defined terminology; in particular, it cuts us
off from psychological dispute. Discussion of the fundamentals of
our science seems to consist one half of obvious truisms, and one
half of metaphysics; this is characteristic of matters which form
no real part of a subject: they should properly be disposed of by
merely naming certain concepts as belonging to the domain of
other sciences (ibid: 153-154).
In this passages, Bloomfield’s motivation of clarifying linguistics comes
out clearly. For a logical reconstruction of Bloomfield’s theory in the next
chapter, beside his Set of Postulates, we will consider his 1933 Language to
be of central importance.
2see Ernst, P. et.al, 2002, for more detailed information on Bloomfield’s contact to
Neurath and Carnap.
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2 Central notions of Bloomfield’s theory
In this section, we introduce the central notions and concepts of Bloomfield’s
theory. We will provide a list of the most important concepts of the theory,
explaining them through examples and showing textual evidence by quot-
ing original passages of Bloomfield’s works. The formal reconstruction and
representation of Bloomfield’s theory will be shown in the next chapter.
1. Bloomfield introduces the notion of utterance as one central element
of his theory. Utterances are produced by acts of speech. The following
quotes illustrate Bloomfield’s position: An act of speech is an utterance
(1926: 154). A speech-utterance is what mathematicians call a contin-
uum; it can be viewed as consisting of any desired number of successive
parts (1933: 76). Example: We imagine a speaker. By making an act
of speech, she makes an utterance. So, any kind of act of speech brings
out an utterance.
2. A speech community is a group of people who interact by means of
speech (1933: 42) and The totality of utterances that can be made in
a speech community is the language of that speech-community (1926:
155). This is necessary if we want to distinguish one language from
another. As it will be shown below, this concept is of central importance
for Bloomfield’s theory. As simple examples, we can think of the group
of speakers of english and the group of speakers of german.
3. Bloomfield’s fundamental assumption of linguistics:
In order to make sense of Bloomfield’s fundamental thesis of alikeness of
utterances, which he needs to distinguish groups of speakers (or speech
communities), the following quote will be helpful:
To recognize the distinctive features of a language, we must leave the
ground of pure phonetics and act as though science had progressed far
enough to identify all the situations and responses that make up the
meaning of speech-forms. In the case of our own language, we trust to
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our everyday knowledge to tell us whether speech-forms are “the same”
or “different”. Thus, we find that the word ‘man’ spoken on various
pitch-schemes is in English still “the same” word, with one and the
same meaning, but that ‘man’ and ‘men’ . . . are “different” words, with
different meanings. In the case of a strange language we have to learn
such things by trial and error, or to obtain the meanings from some-
one that knows the language . . . the study of significant speech-sounds
is phonology or practical phonetics. Phonology involves the considera-
tion of meanings. The meanings of speech-forms could be scientifically
defined only if all branches of science, including, especially, psychology
and physiology, were close to perfection. Until that time, phonology
and, with it, all the semantic phase of language study, rests upon an as-
sumption, the fundamental assumption of linguistics: we must
assume that in every speech-community some utterances are
alike in form and meaning (1933: 77-8).
By working with this assumption, the bloomfieldian linguist can start
to distinguish one group of speaker from another one and, most impor-
tantly, to classify all so-called speech-forms. Out of these speech forms,
the linguist classifies the whole grammar of a language.
4. Now we will turn to Bloomfield’s theory of semantics, which is be-
havioristic. The following quote illustrates Bloomfield’s behaviorist
conception of meaning:
Psychology, in particular, gives us this series: to certain stimuli A a
person reacts by speaking; his speech B in turn stimulates his hearers
to certain reactions C. By a social habit which every person acquires
in infancy from his elders, A-B-C are closely correlated. Within this
correlation, the stimuli A which cause an act of speech and the reactions
C which result from it, are very closely linked, because every person acts
indifferently as speaker or as hearer. We are free, therefore, without
further discussion, to speak of vocal features or sounds B of stimulus-
reaction features A-C of speech (1926: 154).
Example: We imagine a situation A where a person receives a stim-
uli, say, she feels hungry. Then, she might utter something like: “I
am hungry!”. The actual utterance is the situation B, to speak with
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Bloomfield. This utterance, then, will stimulate others to certain reac-
tions, linguistic or non-linguistic, this is Bloomfield’s C.
5. The notion of form is central for Bloomfield. Linguistic forms are
different kinds of units of language, like morphemes or words. The vocal
features common to same or partly same utterances are forms . . . Thus
a form is a recurrent vocal feature which has meaning ... Meaningful
unit of linguistic signaling, smallest or complex: linguistic form; the
meaning of a linguistic form is a linguistic meaning (1933: 264).
Forms are abstract, theoretical concepts. They are non-empirical, as
opposed to utterances, with which the linguist is confronted at the
beginning of his work. Any word is a form. Also the components of
words, in their minimal ocurrence, the morphemes, are forms.
Definition 1:
x is a form :↔ x is recurrent ∧ x is meaningful
6. A minimum form is a morpheme . . . thus a morpheme is a recur-
rent (meaningful) form which cannot in turn be analyzed into smaller
recurrent (meaningful) forms. . . . a minimum form is a morpheme.
Hence any unanalyzable word or formative is a morpheme . . . (1926:
155-156). Parts of bigger linguistic constructions like words are mor-
phemes, e.g. english morphemes as ‘-ness’, ‘-hood’, or ‘-ing’. We are
now able to define ‘morpheme’ in Bloomfield’s theory:
Definition 2:
x is a morpheme :↔ x is a form and ¬∃y (y is a form ∧ y < x)
7. Free and bound forms:
A form which may be an utterance is free. A form which is not free is
bound (1926: 155). A minimum free form, for example, is any word,
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like ‘house’. ‘Free’ aims to suggest that it can stand alone and does
not necessarily have to occur within a bigger linguistic construction.
All that can be uttered with meaning is a free form, then. As opposed
to this, a bound form would be a morpheme, like ‘-ness’. This mor-
pheme, uttered alone, is not an utterance in Bloomfield’s sense, it has
no meaning. Morphemes, on the other hand, are understood as bound
forms. They always occur “bound”, or connected with other words,
like in ‘happi-ness’.
Definition 3:
x is a free form :↔ x is an utterance
Definition 4:
x is a bound form :↔ ¬∃y (y is an utterance ∧ y = x)
8. Word:
Concerning the definition of a word, Bloomfield says: A minimum free
form is a word. A word is thus a form which may be uttered alone (with
meaning) but cannot be analyzed into parts that may (all of them) be
uttered alone (with meaning) (1926: 156). It is important to note that
the emphasis lies on what can be uttered ‘alone’ are words. We can
think of any word, like ‘hello’, ‘stop’, etc.
Definition 5:
x is a word :↔ x is a free form and ¬∃y (y is a free form ∧ y < x)
9. Phrase:
Phrases are used in grammar to distinguish the substructural parts of
sentences. Today, it is standard to distinguish between noun-phrases
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like ‘the dog’ or verbal phrases like ‘bites’, amongst other types of
phrases. As textual evidence, Bloomfield says: A non-minimum free
form is a phrase (1926: 156). Phrases can stand alone, like words.
Definition 6:
x is a phrase :↔ x is a free form and ∃y (y is a free form ∧ y < x)
10. Syntactic constructions:
Now we will approach to what is part of syntactic theory in Bloomfield.
The notion of construction is central here. Different non-minimum
forms may be alike or partly alike as to the order of the constituent
forms and as to stimulus-reaction features corresponding to this order.
The order may be successive, simultaneous (stress and pitch with other
phonemes), substitutive (French au for a le, and so on). Such recurrent
sames of order are constructions . . . The number of constructions in a
language is a small sub-multiple of the number of forms. Each of the
ordered units in a construction is a position. Each position in a con-
struction can be filled only by certain forms (1926: 157-8). Syntactic
constructions, then, are constructions in which none of the immediate
constituents is a bound form (1933: 184).
Definition 7:
x is a syntactic construction :↔ ¬∃y (y is a constituent of x ∧ y is a
bound form)
11. Sentence:
The notion of sentence is explained as follows by Bloomfield: A max-
imum construction in any utterance is a sentence (1926: 158). Inter-
estingly, he speakes of a maximum construction, letting us note that
there is no construction which can be ‘bigger’ than a sentence. This
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goes along with our intuitions, for in every day use of language, what
we understand to be the largest linguistic constructions are usually
sentences. We define a bloomfieldian sentence as follows:
Definition 8:
x is a sentence :↔ x is a construction and ¬∃y (y is a construction ∧
y > x)
12. Phoneme:
The notion of phoneme is also of central importance in Bloomfield’s the-
ory. The phonemes are related to the linguistic forms and to the mor-
phemes and are necessary to constitute the field of phonology within
the whole discipline of linguistics. For Bloomfield a minimum same
of vocal feature is a phoneme or distinctive sound. The number of
different phonemes in a language is a small sub-multiple of the num-
ber of forms. Every form is made up wholly of phonemes (1926: 157)
. . . we can find forms which partially resemble pin, by altering any one
of three parts of the word. We can alter first one ad then a second
of the three parts and still have a partial resemblance . . . pin-tin-tan
. . . and if we alter all three parts, no resemblance is left, as in pin-tin-
tan-tack. Further experiment fails to reveal any more replaceable parts
in the word pin: we conclude that the distinctive features of this word
are the three indivisible units. Each of these units occurs also in other
combinations, but cannot be further analyzed by partial resemblances:
each of the three is a minimum unit of distinctive sound-feature,
a phoneme (1933: 79).
Definition 9:
x is a phoneme :↔ x is a distinctive sound ∧ ¬∃y (y is a distinctive
sound ∧ y < x)
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3 Structuralist Reconstruction
For the logical reconstruction of Bloomfield’s theory, we apply the approach
of structuralist meta-theory, where theories are understood as classes of
model-theoretic structures. The logical structure of an empirical theory is
outlined in terms of set-theoretic predicates, as it was introduced first by
Suppes (1957).3 During the last decades, many case studies out of different
branches of science have been carried out (see Balzer, et.al., 1996, also Dı´ez,
et.al., 2002). By applying the formal tools of set theory, the aim of the struc-
turalist approach is to provide more information about the logical structure
of empirical theories, as it could be provided by the application of meth-
ods of first order propositional logic. In what follows, we will characterize
Bloomfield’s theory within the framework of the structuralist approach.
The framework: In structuralist meta-theory, an empirical theory con-
sists of its models, which are sequences of the form:
〈D1, ..., Dm, R1, ..., Rn〉
The Di are so-called basic sets and the Rj are relations constructed on
these sets. The Di contain what is taken to be the ontology of the theory,
i.e. they contain the objects assumed by the theory as real, the objects (or
the branch of the world) the theory is about. The existence of the entities
which are taken to be the elements of the basic domains of our structures
is merely a posit. It is noteworthy that also in structuralist meta-theory,
objects do only exist within these domains, which are itself a constitutive
part of a structure and specified by the Rj, which are usually functions
4.
In empirical theories which make use of quantitative tools, they usually are
functions mapping empirical objects into the real numbers, or some other
mathematical entities.
To the philosophical motivation on structuralist meta-theory, Moulines
(2008: 163) says “Structuralism owes his name to the fundamental thought
that the most adequate way of interpreting and understanding what a sci-
entific theory is, does not consist in conceiving it as a set of statements, but
rather in conceiving it as a form or collection of different types of complex
structures, which themselves are built up of simpler structures”.
3For the programatic outline of the structuralist program, see Balzer, et.al., 1987
4Hence the name structuralism, or structuralist meta-theory seems reasonable.
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More specifically, in structuralist meta-theory, a theory is understood to
consist of the following sets of models:
1. An empirical theory T, (T = 〈K, I〉) consists of the sets of its core K
and the sets of the intended applications I. K itself consists of sets of
potential models Mp, partial potential models Mpp, actual models M ,
global constraints GC and the global links GL.
2. The I are the sets of the intended applications of a theory. These are
not formally characterized. Their determination depends on pragmatic
constraints.
3. A theory-element is then, formally, the following tuple:
T = 〈Mp,Mpp,M,GC,GL, I〉
A set of potential models (Mp) fixes the general framework, in which
an actual model of a theory is characterized. All entities that can be sub-
sumed under the same conceptual framework of a given theory are members
of the sets of the potential models of this theory. Sets of partial potential
models (Mpp) represent the framework for the corroboration or refutation
of the theory in question, they represent the framework of data, which shall
corroborate or refute a theory. The concepts in Mpp can be determined inde-
pendently of T. Terms which are theoretical (and proper to T) in the potential
models of the respective theory are cut out. Sets of models which do not only
belong to the same conceptual framework, but also satisfy the laws of the
same theory are called the sets of actual models (M) of a theory T. Local
applications of a theory may overlap in space and time. The sets of global
constraints (GC) are formal requirements that constrict the components of
a model in dependence of other components of other models. Constraints ex-
press physical or real connections between different applications of a theory,
i.e. the inner -theoretical relations. The sets of global links (GL) represent
the intertheoretical connections between different theories.
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3.1 Potential models of TBL
Mp(TBL) : x is a potential model of the theory of Bloomfield’s linguistics
(x ∈Mp(TBL)) iff there exist: U,G, E,A,F,M, P, T,T, s, t,≈, form, In,Out, concat,≤
such that:
1. x = 〈U,G, E,A,F,M, P, T,T, s, t,≈, form, In,Out, concat,≤〉
2. U,G, E,A,F,M, P are finite and non-empty.
3. T is a closed interval of R of positive length.
4. T is a set of closed subintervals of T of positive length.
5. s : U → ⋃G
6. t : U → T, t(u) is the least temporal interval in which u was produced.
7. ≈⊆ U × U
8. form : U → F
9. In ⊆ E × F.
10. Out ⊆ F× A.
11. concat : F∞ × F∞ → F∞.
12. ≤⊂ F∞ × F∞.
This represents the general framework of Bloomfield’s theory. All con-
cepts of the theory are explained within the potential model of TBL. The
basic intended interpretation is as follows:
1. The set U is a set of possible but concrete utterances (of words, phrases,
sentences). So this does not include utterances of phonemes or mor-
phemes.
2. G is a set of groups of speakers. The set of groups of speakers is
important for explaining the notion of alikeness of utterances.
3. In order to represent Bloomfield’s semantics formally, we introduce the
following notions:
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E: A set of possible events (within T ).
A: A set of possible actions of members of
⋃
G.
The input-relation In ⊆ E × F.
The output-relation Out ⊆ F× A.
4. F is set of linguistic forms. At the same time, this is the set of mean-
ingful forms, that is, every form is a meaningful form.
5. M is a set of morphemes.
6. P is a set of phonemes.
7. The function s : U → ⋃G, from the set of utterances into the union
set of the set of groups of speakers, where the value s(u) of the function
s at u is the speaker who produced the utterance u.
8. We introduce the function t : U → T, from the set of utterances into the
set of closed subintervals of T , where the value t(u) of the function t at
u is the least temporal interval in which the utterance u was produced
(which we assume to exist).
9. We introduce the following similarity relation:
≈⊆ U × U : meaning that an utterance u is in the relation ≈ to an
utterance v iff u is at least partly like v.
10. In connection to this, the function form : U → F, is introduced.
Here, the value of the function form(u) is the form of an utterance u,
meaning that utterances can be classified into all the different forms
like words, phrases, etc.
11. Several linguistic forms can be concatenated. We introduce the function
concat : F∞ × F∞ → F∞. This is the concatenation function on forms,
where
(F∞ = {〈f1, . . . , fn〉|fi ∈ F, n ≥ 1}.).
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12. Finally, we want to express that two or more linguistic forms can be
combined in order to build bigger linguistic forms. Morphemes, for
instance, are connected and construct bigger forms like words. These
then can be connected to build up bigger forms, like phrases. Hence,
we introduce an ordering relation on the set of linguistic forms. We
call this the parthood relation for forms: ≤⊂ F∞ × F∞.
3.2 Actual models of TBL
TBL is an empirical theory of natural language. Being an empirical the-
ory requires that it contains some laws, or at least lawlike statements. The
issue of lawlikeness in the philosophy of science is varied and controversial.
It might be intuitively clear that in physics, laws are easily identifiable and
their range of applicability is almost always empirically testable. But not
so in linguistics. If we want to contribute to the discussion of lawlikeness
in linguistics, the correct way to go, we argue, will be to proceed from a
concrete empirical theory of language, as it is our example of TBL. If laws
or lawlike statements can be identified in TBL, it might help to establish
more general conclusions on the issue of lawlikeness in linguistic theory. For
the determination of the laws, or lawlike statements of TBL, we define an
actual model of TBL. The fundamental principles of the theory, which are
also required for the determination of the theoretical terms of TBL, are given:
M(TBL) : x is an actual model of the theory of Bloomfield’s linguis-
tics (x ∈ M(TBL)) iff there exist U,G, E,A,F,M, P, T,T, s, t,≈, form, In,
Out, concat,≤, such that:
1. x = 〈U,G, E,A,F,M, P, T,T, s, t,≈, form, In,Out, concat,≤〉 ∈Mp(TBL)
2. Within any G ∈ ⋃G, ≈ contains many edges, but between two distinct
G1,G2 ∈
⋃
G, ≈ contains few edges.
3. ≈ is reflexive and symmetric.
4. A ⊆ E.
5. M ⊆ F.
6. ≤ is reflexive, antisymmetrical and transitive.
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Basic intended interpretation: Condition 1 states that the actual model
is also element of the potential model. But further conditions are necessary
if we want it to become an actual model of TBL. Condition 2 expresses the
fundamental principle of TBL. Namely, that utterances of speakers within
the same group of speakers are more alike than utterances of speakers from
different groups. In this way, it is always possible to distinguish one language
from another. Condition 3 expresses the character of this similarity relation,
its being reflexive and symmetric. Condition 4 tells us that there are more
events than actions, that the set of actions is a subset of the set of events.
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Image 1. The graphical representation of condition 2: Within
any G ∈ ⋃G, ≈ contains many edges, but between two distinct
G1,G2 ∈
⋃
G, ≈ contains few edges.
3.3 Theoretical terms in TBL
In order to address the question of theoretical terms in TBL, we adopt the
structuralist criterion for theoreticity, which states the following:
Term t is T-theoretical if every t-determining model is a model
of T. Or, in other words, if the set of all t-determining models
is included in M(T), or if any method of determination for t is
contained in M(T) . . . Term t being T-theoretical means that t
can be determined only if T’s fundamental laws are presupposed.
In other words: The determination of t only works in situations
in which T’s fundamental laws are satisfied (Balzer, et.al., 1987:
65).
Terms can be theoretical for one theory, but appear to be non-theoretical
in other theories. This criterion relativizes the notion of theoreticity and
makes the status of theoreticity of a term always dependent on a concrete
empirical theory, in which it occurs. In TBL, we say that G is a t-theoretical
term. In order to determinate a group of speakers, condition 2 of the actual
17
model of TBL has to be presupposed. A group of speakers is identified and
determined by this condition.
Another t-theoretical term in TBL is F. Only if the conditions of the ac-
tual model are already presupposed, we can determine F. The notion of form
is central to TBL. Also Bloomfield’s notion of morpheme is t-theoretical.
Hence the set M of morphemes is a t-theoretical term, given that morphemes
are always forms and that forms are t-theoretical. In order to determine a
morpheme, first it has to be clear what a form is. The functions and relations
s, form, In,Out, concat and ≤ are further t-theoretical notions in of TBL.
For them to be applicable, the postulation of G, F or M is required.
3.4 The Partial Potential Models of TBL
After having clarified and determined which terms are t-theoretical in Bloom-
field’s theory, we are able to define the Partial Potential Models of TBL,
where the t-theoretical terms are cut out. The Partial Potential Models are
the data-models of a theory.
Mpp(TBL) : x is a partial potential model of the theory of Bloomfield’s
linguistics (x ∈Mp(TBL)) iff there exist: U,E,A, P, T,T, t,≈ such that:
1. x = 〈U,E,A, P, T,T, t,≈〉
2. U,E,A, P are finite and non-empty.
3. T is a closed interval of R of positive length.
4. T is a set of closed subintervals of T of positive length.
5. t : U → T, t(u) is the least temporal interval in which u was produced.
6. ≈⊆ U × U
3.5 Specializations
We want to show and discuss a specialization of the laws of Bloomfield’s
theory. The structuralist approach proposes the following criterion for the
specialization of laws.
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When considering our reconstruction of Classical Particle Me-
chanics, the reader might already have asked himself where we
have left such important laws of classical particle mechanics as
Newton’s third law (the actio-reactio principle), the law of gravi-
tation, or Hooke’s law. Our answer is: They all constitute differ-
ent but interrelated theory-elements of classical particle mechan-
ics. The whole array, in turn, constitutes what we might call “the
theory-net of classical particle mechanics”. The same holds for
other advanced theories of empirical science. In the case of simple
equilibrium thermodynamics, besides the fundamental equation
and the constraints and links (which, admittedly, provide much of
the content of this theory), one would like to see Nernst’s “Third
Principle of Thermodynamics”, Gay-Lussac’s law, and other more
special laws. Many of these more special laws of the theory are,
moreover, associated with particular constraints and, possibly,
particular links, besides those already explicated when dealing
with the “basic” theory-elements. In other words, the consider-
ation of all these further requirements will end up in the recon-
struction of a whole series of different theory-elements, which,
however, have the same basic structure. Because of this similar-
ity of structure, we can speak of a theory-net and not just an
amorphous set of single, isolated theory-elements (Balzer, et.al.,
1987:168).
We can think of Bloomfield’s theory as the so-called theory-element TBL,
its basic law being condition 2 of its actual model. For a specialization to
obtain, it is required that the basic structure of the theory remains. This
means, in structuralist terms, that its potential models are leaved unchanged,
but that further requirements on the laws are added to its actual models. For
TBL, we propose the following. Condition two of the actual model of TBL
is required if we want to determine similarities of utterances within speaker
groups and between speaker groups. If we only want to talk about one single
language, the relation of similarity between utterances still holds, but will
not hold between groups of speakers, but between speakers within one single
group.
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We say, TBL1 is a specialization of TBL, if: Within any G,≈ contains
many edges.
We obtain a specialization relation TBL1σTBL, between the two theory-
elements. Both theory-elements have the same basic ontology and structure
(i.e. the same potential models), but they differ in their actual models.
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4 Conclusion
As results of the logical reconstruction of Bloomfield’s theory, we obtained
information about the relations between the central terms of the theory. We
determined the theoretical terms of TBL, by relying on the notion of theo-
reticity given by the structuralist approach. About the notion of lawlikeness,
we saw that the fundamental principle, the lawlike statement of Bloomfield’s
theory, concerns the individuation of groups of speakers by a similarity rela-
tion, which Bloomfield needs first in order to establish his whole theory. We
also obtained information about a specialization of Bloomfield’s law about
the individuation of speaker groups.
The reconstruction of Bloomfield’s theory can be taken as a starting point
for the study of intertheoretical relations between structural linguistics (being
Bloomfield’s theory the main representative) and other theories of language,
as it might be transformational grammar, construction grammar or cogni-
tive linguistics. In this sense, it should be seen as a first step towards a
reconstruction of intertheoretical relations between linguistics theories. Un-
derstanding this work as one first contribution, we expect also future insights
related to the debate on scientific realism.
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5 Appendix
More textual passages of Bloomfield’s theory will be shown here. Further
notions which are also part of his theory are mentioned.
All forms having the same functions constitute a form-class. Examples
of English form-classes are: noun-stems, number-affixes, object expressions,
finite verb expressions (1926: 159) .
A form which may be an utterance is free. A form which is not free is
bound (ibid. 155)
Formative: A bound form which is part of a word is a formative. A for-
mative may be complex, as, Latin verb endings -abat, -abant, -abit, -abunt,
etc., or minimum (and hence a morpheme), as Latin -t of third person (1926:
156).
Substitution: A substitute is a linguistic form or grammatical feature
which, under certain conventional circumstances, replaces any one of a class
of linguistic forms. Thus, in English, the substitute ’I’ replaces any singular-
number substantive expression, provided that this substantive expression de-
notes the speaker of the utterance in which the substitute is used. The substi-
tute replaces only forms of a certain class, which we may call the domain of
the substitute; thus, the domain of the substitute ’I’ is the English form-class
of substantive expressions (1933: 247).
Every utterance is made up wholly of forms (1926: 155).
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